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In its rapid and spectacular growth over the past few decades, international
criminal law has been characterized by two foundational principles. First,
international criminal law doctrines have insisted on individual rather than state
responsibility for international crimes.' Second, one of the primary goals of
international criminal law is the deterrence of future criminal activity.' Not
surprisingly, then, international criminal law doctrines have been applied almost
exclusively against individuals, particularly against political and military leaders.3
Such prosecutions have generally been justified as a way to deter future
wrongdoing.4
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. Co-founder of the international law
weblog Opinio Juris.
1. See, e.g., The Trial of Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany, Part 22, 447 ("Crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities.")(emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing
Accountability over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 192 (2003). ("[t]he
pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key
values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts.").
3. See, e.g., Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecution Opening
Statement, 8 (Feb. 12, 2002).
4. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court prmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 ("[dletermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators ... and thus to
contribute to the prevention of [serious international] crimes") [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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Andre Nollkaemper's paper usefully challenges the first of these foundational
principles. 5 According to Nollkaemper, the problem of "system criminality"
reveals a flaw in the international criminal law's focus on individual liability.
6
Because many of the criminal acts prohibited by international criminal law are
inextricably intertwined with the political and legal system from which it emerges,
Nollkaemper argues, international criminal law should be reconsidered to address
these systemic factors. 7 Otherwise, it cannot achieve its second goal of deterring
future criminal activity.
8
In this paper, I will first discuss the importance of the deterrence rationale to the
application of international criminal law. Although deterrence may be a laudable
goal, I will then suggest that the relationship between deterrence and international
criminal law is woefully under-theorized and unsupported by any empirical
evidence. Finally, I consider the effect of Nollkaemper's proposed shift to system
criminality in light of this critique of the deterrence rationale. While in some ways
my critique of the deterrence rationale supports Nollkaemper's overall
recommendation, I suggest that pursuing system criminality would actually tend to
worsen the problems I will identify in my deterrence critique. By widening the set
of individuals who are likely to resist prosecution, the pursuit of system criminality
is more likely to strengthen rather than weaken the regime's resisting international
criminal prosecution, both in the short term and possibly in the long term as well. I
use the recent ICC arrest warrants against Sudan's sitting President and Minister of
the Interior as early evidence of the dangers of Nollkaemper's proposal.
I. The Deterrence Thesis
The movement to develop mechanisms for the enforcement of international
criminal law has a long history, but it gained new momentum in the last decade of
the twentieth century. 9 In that short ten-year span, the world witnessed the
establishment of the first United Nations-sponsored tribunals for the application for
5. Andr6 Nollkaemper, System Criminality in International Law: Can the Law of International




9. See Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 777, 784-85; See GARY A. BASS, STAYING
THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 75-105 (2000) (discussing pre-World War II plans for war
crimes trials).
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international criminal law as well as the creation of the first permanent
International Criminal Court.
The rationale for this explosion in international criminal law tribunals (ICTs)
has been varied. Most of the academic literature has focused on improving the
institutional design of ICTs and rarely offers justifications for the creation and
support of ICTs.' 0 One rationale, however, is almost always offered: supporters of
ICTs typically argue that ICTs can deter or prevent future humanitarian
atrocities. 1
The deterrence rationale for ICTs is often phrased as an argument for
administering punishment as a way to prevent recurrence of the punished acts. As a
leading academic supporter explains, "The pursuit of justice and accountability
fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the
prevention and deterrence of future conflicts.' 2 As former ICTY (International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) judge and scholar Antonio Cassese
has suggested, the failure to punish the Armenian genocide "gave a nod and a wink
to Adolf Hitler and others to pursue the Holocaust some twenty years later."13
This idea that international criminal justice can prevent future atrocities is
reflected in the preamble to the Rome Statute which created the International
Criminal Court.14 The Rome Statute states that the ICC is "[d]etermined to put an
end to impunity for the perpetrators... and thus to contribute to the prevention of
[serious international] crimes."' 15
The manner in which ICTs can prevent future atrocities is usually explained in
two ways. First, advocates argue that the ICTs can change the cultural makeup of a
10. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1633 (2003);
See also Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 1751 (2005).
11. Some academics have recognized the problems with assuming an ICT can deter atrocities,
although most do so only in the context of proposals to increase the use and powers of ICTs
so as to increase the likelihood of deterrence. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Assessing
International Criminal Adjudication of Human Rights Atrocities, THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUDIES 169, 174 (2000-2003); Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and
Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q.
573, 591 (2002).
12. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over
Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191,192 (2003).
13. Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2
(1998).
14. Rome Statute, supra note 4, prmbl.
15. Id.
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society that had previously tolerated atrocities.' 6 Second, ICT supporters have
argued that ICTs will have deterrence effects in the same way that domestic
criminal courts have deterrence effects, an effect that will likely increase as ICT
prosecutions become more common. 17 As prominent human rights advocate
Kenneth Roth once argued, "the ICC could start saving lives tomorrow" if the US
agreed to allow a referral of Sudan to the ICC as opposed to seeking the creation of
an ad hoc court.' 8 Foreign policy scholar Samantha Power made a similar
argument against ad hoc ICTs , which are only created after a particular set of
atrocities occurs and with a necessarily limited jurisdiction. 19 A permanent ICC
prosecution would not only punish individuals in Sudan, but also deter future
atrocities generally.
20
II. The Deterrence Critique
If, as I have argued here, deterrence is an important justification for establishing
international criminal tribunals and for international criminal law more generally,
then it is surprising that there is very little theoretical or empirical work examining
the efficacy of such ICTs and ICL in deterring future atrocities. Scholars and
advocates tend to assume that deterrence will occur, as long as the mechanisms of
international criminal justice are designed properly.
In prior work, Professor Jide Nzelibe and I offered reasons to doubt this easy
assumption.2' One of the most plausible theories for how criminal punishment
deters future crimes draws on economic theory.22 In this view, the two key factors
for deterrence are the likelihood of punishment and the severity of that
punishment. 3 In their calls for institutional reform and effectiveness, most ICT
supporters implicitly accept the usefulness of this framework.24
16. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 13-19 (2001).
17. Theodor Meron, Op-Ed., From Nuremberg to The Hague, 149 MIL. L. REv. 107, 110-11
(1995).
18. See Nicholas Kristof, Op-Ed., Why Should We Shield the Killers?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2005, at A21 (quoting Kenneth Roth, spokesman for Human Rights Watch, who stated
"[t]he I.C.C. could start tomorrow saving lives ... [but w]ith the [ad hoc] tribunal route,
you're talking about another year of killing.").
19. See Samantha Power, Court of First Resort, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A23.
20. Id.
21. Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 9.
22. Id. at 792.
23. Id. at 798.
24. See Power, supra note 19.
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When such a framework is tested against existing data, however, we seriously
doubt that international criminal law can have a significant deterrence effect. As
ICT supporters acknowledge, the likelihood of punishment for international crimes
in an international tribunal is relatively low. But more fundamentally, the severity
of punishment in such a tribunal is also relatively low, especially as compared to
the serious sanctions of murder, imprisonment, and torture that is faced by most
perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities.25 Because, by definition, international
criminal law will apply most often to activities by leaders and governments in
weak or failed states, 26 perpetrators often commit atrocities in the shadow of
atrocities that they fear will be committed against them by their political and
military opponents. In our view, the sanctions of an ICT, which could result in life
imprisonment in only the rarest of cases and would never result in death as a
penalty, are unlikely to have a serious deterrence effect.27
We offered a preliminary empirical assessment of our analysis via data on the
fates of leaders and failed coup plotters in Africa in the post-WWII era.28 We
concluded that such plotters, who represented the type of individuals most likely to
be brought before ICTs or punished by ICL, faced a relatively high likelihood of
severe punishment in the event of a failure to win power. 29 For African leaders
who achieved power, a startling 17.7 percent were killed, and another 41.6 percent
either suffered imprisonment or exile, or both. 30 For coup participants, odds are
even more startling: among coup participants, 28 percent were executed or
otherwise murdered; 22 percent were exiled or imprisoned; and another 16 percent
were arrested without any clear outcomes. 31 Failure in a coup, of course, leads to
even more dire outcomes with a 35 percent execution or murder rate and a 27
percent imprisonment rate.
32
Even if one assumes a high likelihood of punishment by an ICT, there is no way
that an ICT could ever mete out punishments as severe as those faced by likely
perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities. Unless ICT supporters can offer a different
analytical framework or evidence from different empirical sources, the case for
25. See generally Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 9.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 801-810
29. Id.
30. Id. at 804-806
31. See Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 9, at 804-806.
32. Id.
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ICT deterrence has yet to be made. Certainly, this rationale is far weaker than most
of its supporters have assumed.
III. System Criminality and the Deterrence Critique
It is likely that Nollkaemper shares this negative assessment of the deterrence
effects of ICL. After all, the unstated premise of Nollkaemper's paper is that
without a shift toward system criminality, international criminal law is unlikely to
succeed in its efforts to deter international crimes.33 The main difference, therefore,
lies in our comparative prescriptions for reform.
In Nollkaemper's view, the admitted weaknesses of international criminal law
suggest expanding the scope of ICL's targets to include states and systems as
opposed merely to individuals.34 In my view, these same weaknesses suggest a
need for a greater willingness to restrain the ICL in circumstances where it is
unlikely to deter atrocities and, indeed, possibly worsen such atrocities.
One early test case for our competing views is the ICC's current investigation
into serious atrocities arising out of the civil war in Sudan. In 2005, the United
Nations Security Council referred Sudan to the ICC, the first such Security Council
referral in the ICC's history.35 All of the other existing ICC investigations involved
self-referrals by the governments of the countries being investigated.36 But in the
case of Sudan, the government refused to the join the ICC or to accede to the
ICC's jurisdiction.37
Perhaps not surprisingly, the ICC's investigation immediately targeted
prominent members of the existing Sudanese government. In its first action, the
ICC issued an arrest warrant for Ahmad Harun, who was the sitting Minister of
State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan. 38 Raising the stakes in 2008, the
ICC Prosecutor sought, and won, an arrest warrant for the Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's
sitting president and head of the state.
39
33. See Nollkaemper, supra note 5, at 352.
34. Id.
35. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
36. See Communications and Referrals, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Referals+and+communications/ (describing three
state referrals and one referral from UN Security Council.).
37. See Sudan rejects ICCjurisdiction, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org.
38. See generally, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest
(April 27, 2007).
39. See generally, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Warrant of Arrest (March 4, 2009).
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The ICC's Sudan investigation is thus the closest approximation of
Nollkaemper's ideal of attributing criminal liability to the system as opposed to
mere individuals. By issuing arrest warrants for government ministers and the
existing head of state for acts undertaken pursuant to their official authority, the
ICC is effectively indicting the entire Sudanese regime that served under Bashir.
Bashir is not accused of directly ordering assaults or atrocities. 40 Rather, he is
sought for his oversight and administration of a regime that engaged in certain
alleged atrocities.4' Unlike prior trials of heads of state, such as the famous trial ofS 42
Slobodan Milosevic, the ICC is openly targeting the existing regime. It is hard to
imagine the ICC achieving its goals without "regime change" and a fundamental
revision of the governmental system in Sudan. In a sense, therefore, the ICC is
experimenting with Nollkaemper's recommendation to deal with systemic causes
in its prosecution of war crimes in Sudan.
Although the Sudan story has yet to play out, the early signs are not
encouraging for the system criminality view. In response to the arrest warrants, the
Sudanese government expelled all foreign aid organizations. 43 The ICC warrants
even drew sympathy from other African leaders and the African Union.44 The
warrants, at least in the short term, have strengthened rather than weakened the
"criminal system."
Worst of all, the arrest warrant against Bashir poses a nontrivial threat to a
comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan. Under Nollkaemper's view, the
underlying causes of the atrocities cannot be dealt with unless the entire system is
punished and held accountable in some way.45 But, as we see in the case of Sudan,
the campaign against the entire system can also undermine efforts to reach a peace
agreement with the same "criminal" system. As former U.S. Sudan envoy Andrew
Natsios has argued, the continued allegations of a genocide in Sudan, combined
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6-7.
42. Id.
43. Reuters, Sudan expels aid agencies, THE INDEPENDENT (UK), Mar. 5, 2009,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sudan-expels-aid-agencies-1637910.html
(last visited December 10, 2009).
44. African Union in rift with court, BBC NEWS ONLINE (UK), July 3, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8133925.stm. (last visited Jan. 20, 2010)
45. Nollekamper, supra note 5, at 331.
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with the ICC's arrest warrants, threatens efforts to implement past peace
agreements.46
In order to end the atrocities, the international community faces two unattractive
choices: 1) seek a peace agreement with a deeply unsavory regime or 2) seek that
regime's ouster through military intervention or military support for rebel forces
within Sudan. Nollkaemper's approach makes option one nearly impossible.
Option two, however, seems unlikely to occur via ICC-issued arrest warrants
alone. To the extent that Nollkaemper's option makes a peace agreement
impossible, the international community will likely face more atrocities rather than
less, at least in the short term.
To be sure, Sudan is not a perfect test case of Nollkaemper's approach, but it
does reflect elements of his emphasis on systemic rather than individual causes.
And it is not, at least at the time of this writing, a supportive example for system
criminality.
Conclusion
Nollkaemper's essay should be saluted for its recognition of the limitations and
flaws in the deterrence rationale for international criminal law. In many ways, his
essay presumes that, as I have argued in other work, ICL as currently constituted
has very little effective deterrence on serious humanitarian atrocities. And while
his argument for system criminality as a solution to this problem is well-reasoned,
I offer reasons to doubt the efficacy of such an approach. System criminality, I
suggest, is just as likely to harden resistance to peace agreements as it is to lead to
the reduction or deterrence of humanitarian atrocities. Sudan provides some early
evidence of this tragic phenomenon.
46. Andre Natsios, Why the Arrest Warrant Against Sudan's President Will Serve Neither
Peace nor Justice, FOREIGN AFF., Mar. 23, 2009,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64904/andrew-natsios/waltz-with-bashir.
